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Abstract 
Given the opportunity to buy IPO shares of uncertain value at a fixed price, potentially 
informed investors have an incentive to refuse to participate in offerings the underwriter 
happens to overprice.  We show that an underwriter can efficiently resolve this problem by 
entering into a repeat game with a stable coalition of investors who agree to participate in all 
of the bank’s IPOs (block-booking). Using a unique data-set consisting of UK transaction 
records that enables us to identify original investors for all large UK IPOs between 1997 and 
2000, we find strong empirical support for this implication. 
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 I do not approve of anything that tampers with natural ignorance.  Ignorance is like a delicate exotic fruit; touch it 
and the bloom is gone. 
Lady Bracknel (Gwendolen’s lead manager), The Importance of Being Earnest 
 
The enormous volatility in IPO initial returns demonstrates that investment banks generally set 
an IPO’s offer price without possessing any very precise idea about its market value.  This state 
of affairs creates a problem for the underwriting bank: any offer price it sets that exceeds an 
offering’s worst case market value presents investors with the opportunity to “lemon-dodge”, 
that is, to refuse to participate in an offering that the bank happens to overprice.2  Since lemon-
dodging consumes real resources (offerings fail, etc.) but creates no new wealth, the offering 
process would proceed in a more efficient manner if investors would just remain ignorant about 
an IPO share’s precise market value when making their participation decision.   
A bank can bring this state of ignorance about by pooling together its IPOs and offering them to 
a stable coalition of investors as a package deal.  This practice, known as block-booking, works 
in the following manner.  The bank offers shares in each of its IPO to coalition investors at a 
price greater than their worst-case value but less than their expected value, thereby making 
membership in its coalition valuable.  To counteract the incentive to lemon-dodge that arises 
from this practice, a bank commits to eject any investor who does lemon-dodge from its 
coalition (a bank can do so as it allocates shares at its discretion).  An investor must therefore 
choose between remaining in the coalition (and obtaining on average underpriced shares in the 
future) and lemon-dodging once.  The bank then sets each IPO’s offer price at the maximum 
level such that investors choose to remain in the coalition.        
In addition to explaining the most obvious features of the IPO market (underpricing on average 
and highly volatile initial returns), the block-booking theory yields two unique implications 
regarding the pattern of underpricing and the allocation of shares.  Consider pricing first.  The 
gain an investor expects to obtain by remaining in the bank’s coalition is independent of the 
characteristics of the bank’s current offering.  The bank raises an IPO’s offer price from its 
                                                 
2 The rapid convergence between an IPO’s share price and its market value once trading begins (documented by 
Aggarwal and Conroy [2000] among others) suggests that investors know enough to make this problem real. 
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 worst-case value until the benefits of lemon-dodging (avoiding downside risk) equals this 
constant coalition benefit.  It follows that banks set offer prices to equalize downside risk across 
their offerings, not expected returns.  Examining US IPOs over the 1986 to 2003 period, James 
[2004] demonstrates that this is so: while the expected return on high tech IPOs during the 
boom of the late 90’s exceeded that of non-tech IPOs issued in non-boom years by over 35 
percentage points, downside risk across the two groups of offerings differed by a trivial 9 basis 
points.3 
Turning now to allocation, the block-booking theory implies that a bank offers shares in all of its 
IPOs to the investors in its coalition (a bank can set offer price higher when offering shares to 
coalition investors rather than to lemon-dodging non-coalition investors).  We test this 
implication here with a unique dataset that enables us to observe original investors for a sample 
of all 130 domestic UK IPOs that raised more than £10 million over the 1997 to 2000 period.  
We find that: 1) the probability that a bank selects a given investor to participate in one of its 
IPOs is far higher if that investor has participated in the bank’s previous IPOs; and 2) the 
characteristics of the deals in which an investor has participated do not affect this selection 
probability.  Our data allows us to control for each investor’s general level of participation in the 
IPO market, so we are confident that our finding that banks form coalitions is not an illusion 
arising from the fact that all banks draw IPO investors from the same small pool.  Thus, we 
conclude that banks do block-book their IPOs. 
Previous Literature 
Kenney and Klein [1983] were the first to explore the economics of block-booking.  We apply 
their general analysis to the specific circumstances of the IPO market.  In so doing we extend 
and modify the Information Extraction (IE) approach to understanding underwriting pioneered 
by Benveniste and Spindt [1989], Benveniste and Wilhelm [1990], and Sherman and Titman 
[2002].  In our view the IE theory does the best job of explaining the IPO market’s observed 
empirical regularities, so we concentrate on that theory here.  Ritter and Welch’s [2002] excellent 
survey of the extensive IPO literature provides an overview of the alternatives. 
                                                 
3 The block-booking theory can therefore explain the “risk”/expected return relationship documented by Asquith, 
Jones and Kieschnick [1998], building upon earlier papers by Beatty and Ritter [1986] and Ibbotson, Sindelar, and 
Ritter [1988].   
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 In the IE approach, a generally observable IPO type comes in a variety of flavors (e.g., high 
value and low value) observable by investors alone.  The task of the bank is then to extract the 
information investors possess so as to set an IPO’s offer price more accurately.  To do so, the 
bank forms a stable coalition of investors and rewards the investors who provide their 
information with underpriced shares (engaging in a repeat game with a stable set of investors 
reduces the average discount needed to sustain the equilibrium).  In this framework, however, an 
investor has an incentive to declare an IPO’s value to be lower than it in fact is so as to get high 
value shares at a low price.  To limit an investor’s incentive to engage in such behavior, the bank 
allocates shares in IPOs the investors declare to be of high value to coalition investors (at a 
discount) and allocates the shares coalition investors declare to be of low value to non-coalition 
investors at their expected value. 
The IE approach does a good job of explaining why banks underprice IPOs on average and why 
banks form investor coalitions.  The IE approach also provides an explanation for why banks 
take their offerings on “road-shows” for potential investors (we show below that a block-
booking bank will also use road-shows to extract information on an IPO’s flavor).  However, the 
IE approach provides a less satisfactory account for why initial returns are so volatile.  If initial 
investors are really getting–generously–compensated for the information they provide on market 
value, one would think that they would do a better job.  Furthermore, the IE theory provides 
little insight into how the pattern of underpricing will vary across different observable types of 
IPOs (tech vs. non-tech).  After all, the bank need hardly compensate investors for providing 
information that it can easily observe itself.  And, while the IE approach does imply that banks 
form coalitions, it does not imply that they allocate shares in all of their IPOs to coalition 
investors.4    
Turning now to previous empirical research on share allocation, the fact that investment banks 
                                                 
4 Of course, the existing empirical evidence on allocation already provides little support for the IE theory’s 
implication that banks exclude coalition investors from a subset of their IPOs.  IE theorists have attempted to 
reconcile their theories with this evidence in two ways.  First, they argue that the separation result is far starker in 
theory than it is in reality.  Benveniste and Wilhelm [1990], for example, suggest that if a project could assume a 
continuum of values rather than just the two (high/low) they model, the bank would exclude coalition investors 
from only IPOs with the (seldom observed) lowest possible share value (empirically: those with an expected return 
of zero).  However, Asquith, Jones, and Kieshnick’s [1998] analysis of IPO return distributions finds that zero 
expected return IPOs are in fact far from uncommon.  The second argument is that a bank (somehow) just has to 
offer shares in all of its IPOs to its coalition (Hanley and Wilhelm [1995], Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm [1996]).  
We find this “coalition investors must participate” constraint to be extremely artificial, as banks do not have any 
incentive (within the IE approach) to behave in this manner. 
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 very rarely disclose any information on allocation has limited both the detail of the questions that 
can be explored and the size of the sample with which to explore them.  For example, Hanley 
and Wilhelm [1995] find that, for one (US) bank from whom they could obtain data, institutional 
investors as a whole receive roughly the same proportion of each offering.  Cornelli and 
Goldreich [2001], examining IPOs and secondary offerings at a single (European) bank, find that 
higher allocations are given to those institutional investors who participate regularly and to those 
who reveal strong indications of interest.  Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri [2002] obtain similar 
results with US data.  
One potential problem with generalizing single bank results is that it is difficult to tell if the 
investors who participate regularly in that bank’s IPOs are really part of that bank’s coalition or if 
the bank selects investors at random from the pool of possible investors, with a given investor’s 
selection probability determined by its size (etc.).  Our data allows us to overcome this problem, 
as it enables us to directly examine individual investors’ participation in IPOs across multiple 
banks.  We can therefore estimate the probability that a given investor participates in a given 
bank’s IPOs controlling for that investor’s general level of participation in the IPO market.  We 
are, to our knowledge, the first to do so. 
I. A Model of Block-Booking 
A. Set-up and Assumptions 
We model the IPO process as a game involving entrepreneurs with projects to sell, investors 
with money to invest, and a bank that intermediates between the two.  
Projects 
Projects consist of a single observable type that comes in two flavors H and L.  In each period T 
Fate endows an entrepreneur with either an H or an L project, each with probability ½.  The 
value of the period T project is VT, which lies on the range [0, VMax].   For H (L) projects, V is 
drawn at random from distribution WH (WL), with density wH (wL).  L projects are more likely to 
find their values closer to 0 than are H projects.  Formally, Prob[VT|H < V*] < Prob[VT|L < V*] 
for all V* < VMax – ε.  A project consists of a single infinitely divisible share. 
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 The Bank 
The bank competes for the business of risk neutral entrepreneurs by devising an underwriting 
method that is successful,5 and, conditional upon achieving success, maximizes expected offer 
price.  We assume that the bank charges a fixed fee for underwriting projects, which we set to 0 
for convenience. 
The bank sets offer prices and selects the investors to whom it offers shares at its discretion.  
The bank can not observe either a project’s flavor (H or L) or its value (VT) before setting its 
offer price (PT).6       
Investors 
Investors behave competitively, are risk neutral, and maximize profits (π).  Investors and the 
bank live forever.  It follows that the bank and investors can form long-term relationships if they 
so wish.  Each investor the bank selects for a given IPO invests $1.   
We incorporate the idea that investors, by virtue of their position in the market, possess 
information on project value not known to the bank in two ways.  First, investors can observe a 
project’s flavor.  Second, an investor can detect (at some small cost ε) if VT < PT when presented 
with a concrete offer to buy at PT.  An investor “lemon-dodges” when he avoids participating in 
an ex-post overpriced IPO. 
Sequence of Play 
Each period consists of the following phases: 
τ1: An entrepreneur presents his project to the bank.  Investors observe its flavor. 
τ 2:  The bank presents the project to selected investors at a “road-show” and polls them on its 
flavor (investors need not declare truthfully);    
                                                 
5 We make this assumption for convenience, but our results require only that having a deal fail imposes a cost.  
Sherman [2002] shows that auctions have a higher probability of failure than book-building (of which block-booking 
is a varient), and argues that this risk accounts why underwriters do not use auctions to allocate IPO shares. 
6 The bank can not set a project’s offer price at a level higher than its best estimate of the project’s value.  For 
simplicity, we assume that this constraint does not bind in the analysis below.   
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 τ 3: The bank sets T’s offer price PT and offers the share to investors;  
τ 4:   The selected investors decide whether or not participate;  
 τ 5:   If the investors choose to purchase, the offering is successful and trading begins.  The 
project’s flavor and market value are revealed.  
B.  Block-Booking  
A bank could market an IPO by simply asking a randomly selected group of investors to declare 
its flavor and then offering these investors that IPO at its expected value.  And, if investors 
would declare flavor truthfully and would disdain the practice of lemon-dodging, then this 
underwriting method would be socially efficient, as this method would maximize expected 
proceeds for entrepreneurs while providing investors with a non-negative return.  However, in 
this situation, investors would both have an incentive to declare type H projects to be of (lower 
expected value) type L and would find it profitable to embrace rather than to disdain the practice 
of lemon-dodging.  To get around the problems posed by (potentially) misleading, lemon-
dodging investors, the bank must devise a more sophisticated underwriting method. 
We think that this more sophisticated method is block-booking.  To block-book, a bank enters 
into a repeat game with a stable coalition on investors.  It offers the investors the following deal: 
♦ The bank underprices its IPO shares on average, thereby making coalition membership 
valuable; 
♦ The bank ejects from its coalition any investor who lemon-dodges; and 
♦ The bank sets each IPO’s offer price at the maximum level such that an investor finds 
the profits of remaining in the coalition higher than the expected profits of lemon-
dodging once.7 
 
                                                 
7 For simplicity, we assume that the bank can detect lemon-dodging with probability 1.  As lemon-dodging becomes 
harder to detect, the average discount the bank must offer to get block-booking to work will increase. 
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 Implementing Block-Booking 
Assume for the moment that the bank can induce investors to declare each IPO’s flavor 
truthfully (we show how the bank can do so below).  The bank and investors then know each 
IPO’s share value distribution.  Suppose that the bank sets T’s offer price to PT.  Recalling that 
an investor invests $1 in each offering for which he is selected, the expected return an investor 
obtains by remaining in the bank’s coalition (buying in all cases) equals 
 
[ ]
[ ] [ ]TPTUTPTλ
dVw
TP
TPTVdVw
TP
TPTVπE
MaxT,
T
T V
P
TT
P
0
BB
+−=
−+−−= ∫∫
        (1) 
λ (U) measures absolute value of downside (upside) risk, that is, the portion of the investor’s 
expected return due to the possibility that VT may be less than (greater than) PT.  Obviously, 
λT|(PT=0) = 0 and ∂λ/∂P > 0.  
If an investor lemon-dodges, he avoids downside risk but he loses future coalition profits of χ.  
Hence, 
 [ ] [ ] χPUπE TTLD −=  (2) 
In equilibrium the bank sets offer price a the maximum level (PBB) such that 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
χ][P
πEχPUPPUπE
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The profit an investor expects to obtain by remaining in the bank’s coalition is independent of 
the type of IPO the bank underwrites in the current period.  That is, χ is a constant.  It follows 
that a given value of χ implies an equilibrium set of prices for H and L IPOs.  Denote a set of 
offer prices {PH,BB, PL,BB} that satisfy equation 3 as P*.  As a higher value of PH,BB will imply a 
higher value of PL,BB, we shall speak loosely of P* itself as increasing or decreasing.      
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 Now consider χ in more detail.  Denote the present discounted number of the bank’s future 
IPOs in which an investor expects to participate by N.  It follows that 
 [ ]( ) [ ]( )BB,LLBB,HH*T PVE2NPVE2Nχ −+−==λ P              (4) 
The bank then chooses P* to satisfy equation 4.  It is obvious that there is a unique P* that 
does so, as downside risk increases in P* and coalition profits decrease in P*.  Denote the 
offer prices that bring this result about as PH,BB and PL,BB.  Consider two implications of this 
equilibrium.   
Proposition 1:  A block-booking underprices its IPOs on average. 
Proof: If a bank sets PT > 0, then λT > 0, implying that χ > 0 in equilibrium.  Since χ > 0 iff N 
* (E[V] – E[P]) > 0, it follows that E[V] > E[P].      
∴ 
Proposition 2: A bank that block-books will allocate shares in all of its IPOs to the investors in its coalition. 
Proof: Suppose that a bank can offer an IPO to either coalition (N > 0) or non-coalition (N 
= 0) investors.  If the bank selects the coalition investors, then the offer succeeds (no lemon-
dodging) and PT > 0.  If the bank chooses non-coalition investors and sets PT > 0, then DT > 
0 and χ = 0, implying that the non-coalition investors lemon-dodge (πLD = UT|P – χ No Coalition 
> πNo LD = UT|P – λT|P).  The bank therefore allocates all IPOs to coalition investors.        
∴ 
Under the block-booking theory, a bank underprices shares (on average) and allocates those 
shares to a stable coalition of investors so as to deter investors from embarking upon a socially 
inefficient quest for information on share value (lemon-dodging).  Under the information 
extraction theory that we discussed in the introduction, on the other hand, a bank underprices 
shares and allocates at least flavor H IPO shares to a stable coalition of investors so as to induce 
investors to reveal project type.  Since we derived the block-booking equilibrium assuming that 
the bank knew project flavor, one might wonder if we have simply assumed away the real 
problem that an actual bank must solve.  To allay any such concerns, we now show that a block-
booking bank can (almost costlessly) extract information on project flavor from coalition 
investors.       
To see why truthful revelation may be a problem, recall that the share value distribution of H 
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 IPOs lies to the right of that of L IPOs.  Since the bank acts to equalize downside risk across its 
offerings (see James [2004]), it follows that PL,BB <PH,BB.  Hence, investors will benefit if they can 
convince the bank to offer H IPOs at PL,BB instead of PH,BB.  To counteract this incentive, the 
bank can exploit collective action problems among investors.       
Proposition 3: A block-booking bank can almost costlessly induce coalition investors to reveal project flavor 
truthfully by exploiting collective action problems among them.  
Intuition: The bank polls investors at the road-show as to project flavor and acts as if the 
project is of the type declared by the majority.  Investors have a collective interest in 
persuading the bank that H projects are L projects as L projects have a lower offer price.  
However, the bank ejects investors who mislead it from its coalition, depriving those 
investors of the profits they could expect to obtain by purchasing on average underpriced 
IPO shares in the future.  It follows that each individual investor has an incentive to free-ride 
upon the deception created by other investors.  The probability that any one investor’s H or L 
vote affects offer price declines as the number of investors increases.  The bank can therefore 
make it optimal for each individual investor to declare project flavor truthfully by a 
combination of choosing a coalition of sufficient size shading down the offer price of H 
projects.  Since banks can construct reasonably (if not infinitely) large coalitions, they will 
never have to shade H IPO offer prices down by much to bring this result about.   
Proof: See Appendix            
∴  
So, if a bank does block-book, one would expect the offering process to proceed as follows.  
After an entrepreneur approaches the bank with a project to sell, the bank presents the project to 
its coalition investors at a road-show (with an offer price range of PL,BB to PH,BB).  At the road-
show, the bank polls investors on the project’s flavor and incorporates this information when 
deciding upon the project’s final offer price (choosing PL,BB or PH,BB).  Finally, the bank offers 
coalition investors shares at the offer price, and the investors accept (i.e., do not lemon-dodge).  
We think that this (stylized) description of the offering process is consistent with what happens, 
as discussed in Hanley and Wilhelm [1995] and Cornelli and Goldreich [2001]. 
Efficiency 
While we have now demonstrated that a bank can block-book, and have explored what one 
would expect to observe if a bank does block-book, we have yet to show that a bank would wish 
to block-book.  We turn to that question now.  We assume in this section that the bank 
underwrites just one flavor of IPO so as to avoid the need to explicitly take into account the 
constraint that an IPO’s offer price cannot exceed its expected value. 
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 Proposition 4: An entrepreneur will never prefer a non-block-booking bank (whatever method it uses) to a block-
booking bank in a position to underwrite a sufficient volume of projects.  
Proof: Denote the value of λ that occurs when P = E[V] as λ Max.  Investors choose not to 
lemon-dodge if     
[ ]( )αMax MaxPVENα −λ=λ−≤−λ   (5) 
Note that P < E[V] if α > 0 and that P → E[V] as α → 0.  It follows from equation 8 that 
there is an N* such that, if N > N*, the block-booking equilibrium holds.  Since a block-
booking bank maximizes P, the bank also chooses λ T > λ Max – α if N > N*.  Hence,     
[ ] [ ]VEPLimit
N
=
∞→
 (6) 
Since an entrepreneur can never expect to obtain more than E[V] for his project, a non-
block-booking bank will not be able to offer an entrepreneur a higher expected offer price 
for his project than a block-booking bank in a position to underwrite a sufficient volume of 
deals.  
∴ 
Having established that a block-booking bank can attract entrepreneurs with projects to sell, we 
now consider whether or not this state of affairs is a good thing from the perspective of the 
economy as a whole.     
Proposition 5: The practice of block-booking maximizes the expected net wealth created per project.  Block-
booking therefore leads to static efficiency. 
Proof: The period T project creates gross wealth of VT.  The period T entrepreneur receives 
PT and investors receive VT – PT.  Hence, the investors and the entrepreneur split the entire 
gross value of each project, implying that the net wealth created per projected equals the 
gross wealth created per project.  It follows that block-booking maximizes the net wealth 
created per project.    
∴ 
Proposition 6: Block-booking provides, in the limit, first best incentives for entrepreneurs to create projects.  Block-
booking therefore promotes dynamic efficiency. 
Proof: Entrepreneurs possess socially optimal incentives to create new projects when the 
price they expect to obtain (E[PT]) equals the expected gross wealth created per project 
(E[VT]).  It follows from Proposition 4 block-booking achieves dynamic efficiency as N 
approaches infinity.     
∴ 
Consequently, a bank that chooses to block-book its IPOs will be in an excellent position to 
10 
 attract entrepreneurs with projects to sell.  Furthermore, since block-booking is also socially 
efficient, investors and entrepreneurs have no incentive to enter into some Coasian bargain to 
jointly develop an alternative underwriting regime.  Thus, we think that banks in a position to 
exploit the advantages of block-booking will block-book.8  
II. Do Banks Form Coalitions? 
So, do banks in fact block-book?  We established above that the hypothesis that banks do block-
book is consistent with what previous research has revealed about the way the offering process 
works and with the pattern of underpricing that this offering process generates.  The block-
booking hypothesis also yields the additional empirical implication that       
♦ A block-booking bank forms a strong and stable coalition of investors to which it 
allocates shares in all of its IPOs (Proposition 2). 
We therefore assay the block-booking hypothesis against the data by seeing if this 
implication holds. 
A.  Designing the Test 
If a bank does in fact select investors for its IPOs from a stable coalition, then one may identify 
the members of that bank’s coalition by seeing who it selects.  This observation suggests that one 
may test the proposition that banks block-book by:  
♦ Sorting each bank b’s IPOs by offer date, and splitting the IPOs into a control group 
(the first Cb IPOs) and a test group (the remaining Tb IPOs, numbered t=1...T); 
♦ Identifying an investor as a putative member of b’s coalition if b selected that investor 
for one of its control group IPOs; and  
                                                 
8 Sherman [2002] provides an analysis of why bookbuilding is superior to allocating IPO shares by auction.  
Consistent with her analysis, Derrien and Womack [2003] find that bookbuilding generally leads to less underpricing 
than allocation by auction (using a dataset from France where both methods are used).  However, due to an 
institutional feature of the French market, banks that use the bookbuilding method face constraints when adjusting 
the offer price to information arising during the offering process.  When these constraints bind, the amount of 
underpricing is greater under the bookbuilding method.  Banks in the US and UK markets do not labor under these 
constraints, and we do not include such constraints in our analysis.       
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 ♦ Seeing if the bank preferentially selects the investors in its putative coalition for its test 
group IPOs. 
We implement this test as follows (we summarize our variable definitions in Table I).  We first 
construct a sample of potential IPO investors consisting of eligible (as we define below) 
investors who we can identify as taking a position in at least one control group IPO within its 
first 40 trading days.  We number these investors with i, i = 1...I.  Denoting IPO t underwritten 
by bank b as IPOb,t, we then track participation (Yes/No) by sample investors in test group IPOs 
with the variable InvestYNi,t,b, with   
♦ InvestYNi,t,b = 1 if investor i participates in IPO t (underwritten by bank b), and 0 
otherwise. 
We then construct three coalition membership variables, viz., BookZeroRi,t,b, BookOnei,t,b, and 
BookManyi,t,b, with 
♦ BookZeroRi,t,b = 1 if investor i participated in at least one zero expected return control 
group IPO brought public by the bank (b) underwriting the current IPO (t), and 0 
otherwise;9 
♦ BookOnei,t,b = 1 if investor i participated in only one control group IPO brought public 
by the bank (b) underwriting the current IPO (t), and 0 otherwise; and 
♦ BookManyi,t,b = 1 if investor i participated in at least two control group IPOs brought 
public by the bank (b) underwriting the current IPO (t), and 0 otherwise. 
Before proceeding, consider these coalition measures in more detail.  We developed the block-
booking theory assuming that a single bank was wholly responsible for bringing a given project 
to market, and in our empirical work we assign an IPO to its bookrunner.  In reality, of course, 
most offerings are handled by syndicates.  Furthermore, banks may hold back a proportion of 
IPO shares to allocate to non-coalition investors, perhaps to create a liquid market or to avoid 
creating a dominant shareholder (Brennan and Franks [1997]).  Consequently, we would not 
                                                 
9 Following Asquith, Jones and Kieschnick [1998], we identify an IPO as a zero expected return IPO if its actual 
return fell into the –5% to +5% range. 
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 expect to find that IPO shares are exclusively allocated to the members of the bookrunner’s 
coalition.10   
These considerations suggest that, under the block-booking theory, one may order the three 
coalition membership variables by strength as follows: BookZeroR, BookOne, BookMany.  
BookZeroR will, under the block-booking theory, simply be an incomplete measure of coalition 
membership as it is based upon only a subsample of a bank’s control group IPOs, and 
BookMany will be a stronger measure of coalition membership that BookOne as it is likely that 
an investor who appears frequently among the original investors in a given bank’s deals is there 
because the bank is deliberately choosing him.  Under the Information Extraction (IE) theory, 
on the other hand, a bank offers shares in zero expected return IPOs to non-coalition investors.  
Hence, the IE theory implies that BookZeroR is a measure of coalition non-membership rather 
than coalition membership.  If the IE theory is correct, then, one would expect to find that 
banks do not select the investors who appear in zero expected initial return control group IPOs 
to participate in their test group IPOs. 
In light of these considerations, we test the block-booking theory by estimating the following 
two probit equations (we discuss control variables below): 
(CT1) InvestYN = β0 + β1 * BookZeroR 
 (7) 
(CT2)  InvestYN = γ0 + γ 1* BookZeroR + γ 2* BookOne + γ 3* BookMany 
 
CT1 provides a direct test of the IE theory as, under this theory, β1 will be insignificant (or even 
negative).  CT2 sheds further light on bank coalitions.  We expect to find that both γ 2 and γ 3 are 
positive and significant, and that γ 3 > γ 2.  Furthermore, since, from the perspective of the block-
booking theory, BookZeroR contains no information not contained in BookOne and 
BookMany, we also expect to find that γ 1 is insignificant. 
 
                                                 
10 Once a bank constructs a large enough coalition of institutional (potentially lemon-dodging) investors to ensure 
that its offerings will succeed, other investors (not necessarily in a position to lemon-dodge) will know that the 
expected return on an IPO share is positive.  A block-booking bank can therefore allocate a proportion of each 
offering to such investors knowing that they will choose to participate. 
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 An Alternative Hypothesis and Control Variables 
IPO theories in general (and ours is no exception) envision a world in which banks devise 
intricate pricing and allocation strategies to induce investors to behave in the appropriate fashion 
(which varies from theory to theory).  One might instead suppose that banks simply select 
investors from the pool of suitable investors at random, with the selection probability being a 
function of investor characteristics. 
If banks did behave in this way, what look like “coalitions” could still arise in the data in the 
following manner.  If a given investor i has a high selection probability, bank b is likely to have 
selected i for one of its control group IPOs.  The bank is also likely to select that investor for its 
test group IPOs.  Hence, γ 2 and γ 3  will be significant and positive (and γ 1 will be insignificant), 
but only because BookOne and BookMany measure the same investor specific selection 
probability rather than because bank b preferentially selects its investors from a stable coalition.   
Exploiting the fact that we have participation data for all UK IPOs over our sample period, we 
can control for this possibility with the variable GenParti, with 
♦ GenParti = The proportion of control group IPOs in which investor i took a position in 
the first 40 trading days. 
If the probability that a bank selects a given investor for one of its test group IPOs is a function 
of that investors general level of activity in the IPO market, then including GenParti into 
specifications 1 and 2 above will render γ 1, γ 2 and γ 3  insignificant (as they will be nothing more 
than poor measures of GenPart).  If these coefficients remain positive after including a GenPart 
term, then one may be confident that banks do indeed form coalitions.  
Since the probability that a bank selects a high GenPart investor may not be a linear function of 
GenPart and coalition membership, we also include a BookMany/GenPart interaction term in 
specification 2.       
Of course, the probability that a bank selects a given investor to participate in one of its IPOs is 
also a function of how many investors the bank picks, which in turn will be a function of the size 
of the IPO.  Assuming that banks wish to create a fairly diffuse shareholding for liquidity 
purposes–implying that the number of investors per IPO will not decrease proportionally as an 
IPO’s size decreases–we also include a Ln[Size] term in our regressions.   
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 Last, we also include individual bank coalition strength variables.  Individual banks vary 
considerably in their prestige/market share, so we thought that it would be interesting to see if 
all banks form coalitions of equal strength.  Each major bank has its own variable.  We assign a 
single dummy to SecondTier to all minor banks.  For reasons of confidentiality, we label the 
major bank variables BCS1 to BCS9.  We define a bank coalition strength variable follows: 
♦ Individual BCSbi,t = 1 if bank b is the book for the current IPO (t), and if investor i 
participated in one of its control group IPOs (i.e., if BookZeroR, BookOne, or 
BookMany = 1), and 0 otherwise. 
A BCS variable will thus capture the extent to which an investor’s selection probability will vary 
across banks given that the investor belongs to a bank’s coalition. 
B.  The IPO Sample 
Our empirical analysis requires data on IPOs and their investors. We take as our IPO sample all 
new equity offerings on the London Stock Exchange (i.e., that appear on the Official List) or the 
London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) over the period 1 January 1997 
- 3 August 2000 that raised at least £10 million.11  These criteria leave us with a sample of 130 
IPOs (see Table II for summary statistics on the IPO sample). 
To implement our coalition test, we divide the IPOs in our sample into a control group and 
a test group.  To do so, we sort each bank’s IPOs by offer date and allocate the first 2/3rds 
of the IPOs to the control group and the remaining 1/3rd to the test group.  We provide a 
breakdown of the two groups by bank in Table III.  Banks that underwrote less than 3 IPOs 
have all of their IPOs allocated to the control group (we use data from these IPOs to 
identify investors and to calculate GenPart). 
This simple description masks several complexities.  First, though IPOs are generally 
underwritten by syndicates, one cannot analyze a syndicate as a single meta-bank because 
syndicates are not that stable.  Consequently, we assign each IPO to its bookrunner.  
However, even thinking about a “book” over time is not without difficulty.  First, several of 
the banks in our sample merged over the course of our sample period.  To deal with 
                                                 
11 We excluded offerings of units or investment trusts from our sample. 
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 ownership changes, we assume that, if banks A and B merge to form C, then C inherits the 
coalitions of both A and B.  So, for a bank C IPO in our test group, we include both bank 
A and bank B IPOs in C’s control group.  We treat the case of multiple books as a 
temporary merger: if a given test group deal is underwritten by banks A and B, we construct 
our coalition membership variables on the basis of both A and B control group IPOs. 
To construct the BookZeroR variable, we also need to sort control group IPOs by expected 
return.  In light of the empirical results of Asquith, Jones, and Kieshnick [1998], we assume 
that IPOs with an actual initial return of between –5% and +5% fall into the zero expected 
return group, and that all other IPOs fall into the positive expected return group.12 
C.  The Investor Sample 
Our investor coalition test requires tracking IPO participation on an individual investor 
level across all the IPOs in our sample.  We do so using a dataset known as Sabre, an 
internal trade reporting dataset collected by the UK’s financial regulator the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA).  Though the legal underpinnings and precise details of the 
reporting rules are complex, it suffices here to say that–basically– any firm executing a 
secondary market trade (On or Off-Exchange) cleared and settled in London must report 
that trade to the FSA.  As a bonus, many firms do not bother to separate primary and 
secondary market transactions and so report both.  A transaction report will contain data 
that allows one to observe the identity of the Reporting Firm and the Ultimate Transactor 
(UT).  
Reflecting the fact that Sabre is derived from clearing records, UTs are reported on the 
“account” level.  There are two sorts of accounts in the data, those associated with FSA 
authorized firms and those that are not. Accounts associated with authorized firms (e.g., 
Mercury Asset Management) are tagged with a unique market-wide ID known as a SIB 
Reference (or SIBREF) number.  A SIBREF follows an authorized firm in all of its 
transactions, and so enables us to track an authorized firm in its dealings across banks.  
Non-authorized (e.g., retail) investors do not have a unique market-wide identifier, and so 
                                                 
12 We experimented with other sorting schemes, but the empirical results below held no matter what sorting scheme 
we used. 
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 can only be observed on the account level.  Consequently, there is no way to link accounts 
held by the same non-authorized investor across banks.13  
Given the way the data is reported, is not possible to calculate a General Participation level 
for investors who are not authorized firms.  Since GenPart is a key variable in our analysis, 
we therefore focus our empirical work upon authorized firms.  We do not think that 
limiting our focus in this way will hinder our ability to detect investor coalitions (if they 
exist), as: 1) it is likely that institutional investors will form the core of any coalition; and 2) 
virtually every entity that one would think of as an institutional investor requires 
authorization (with the exception of hedge funds).14 
Taking our focus on authorized firms as given, there is still the question of whether we 
examine them on the account level or the SIBREF level.  The question is important as a 
single authorized firm can transact through more than a dozen separate accounts in a single 
deal.  Since it seems unlikely to us that each such account represents an autonomous 
economic agent acting within the authorized firm’s umbrella, we think it more economically 
meaningful to aggregate account level data by SIBREF.   
While authorized firms will generally correspond to economic agents, this correspondence is 
weaker for firms with complex organizational structures such as investment banks.  Since 
one would generally expect the various subsidiary parts of a bank to get involved in a deal 
the bank is underwriting (either as the book or as a syndicate member), failing to take the 
complex organizational structure of a bank into account could create a bias in favor of 
finding coalitions.  We remove this potential for bias by further aggregating SIBREFs to 
bank level for each book and syndicate member for each IPO in our sample.  We then 
exclude any of these bank SIBREFs from the list of an IPO’s participating investors. 
Most authorized firms (let alone retail investors) never become involved in the IPO market.  
We therefore take as our investor sample authorized firms (examined on the SIBREF level) 
                                                 
13 Strictly speaking, there is also a third type of account (much less common than the other two).  Firms authorized 
in non-UK jurisdictions (e.g., the Bank of New York) are at least sometimes tagged with their Bank Identifier Code 
(or BIC) number.  However, linking accounts with BIC numbers is not required in the UK, and we are unsure as to 
the extent of this practice.  We use BIC codes like SIBREFs when available.  This practice allows us to increase 
(slightly) the number of institutions whose participation in IPOs we can track.    
14 There exist about 55,000 authorized firms in the UK with SIBREF numbers. 
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 that took a position in at least one of the IPOs in our sample within its first 40 trading days. 
10,303 authorized firms did so. 
Identifying Investors That Participate in IPOs 
We count a sample investor (SI) as a participant in an IPO if: 
♦ The SI bought on the offer day at the offer price; or  
♦ The SI had a negative net position in the issue at the close of its 40th trading day15  
We include the negative net position channel because we reasoned that an investor selling 
shares from “no where”–recall that Sabre contains all secondary market transactions–most 
likely acquired those shares in an unreported primary market transaction.  In total, we 
identify 4322 IPO participants.  Of this total, 3804 enter via the original purchase channel 
and the remaining 518 enter via the negative net position channel (see Table IV). 
The 4322 investors who participate in at least one IPO participate a total of 7697 times in 
the 130 sample IPOs (i.e., each investor who participates in at least one IPO participates in 
an average of 1.8 IPOs).  However, the participation distribution is highly skewed.  To 
illustrate this point, we plot the conditional probability that a SI participates in at least X+1 
IPOs given that he has participated in at least X (see Figure 1).  Inspecting the figure, one 
can see that a SI participates in at least one IPO with probability 0.4.  However, given that a 
SI has participated in at least 5 IPOs, he participates in at least one more with probability 
0.8. 
If banks selected investors at random this conditional probability plot would be flat (just as 
the conditional probability of getting “heads” while flipping a coin for the Nth time is 50% 
independent of the number of heads one obtained on the first N – 1 flips).  Since this plot 
in fact rises steeply, this plot demonstrates that banks as a group preferentially select the 
investors for their IPOs from a small charmed circle. 
The conditional probability plot also suggests that the investors in this charmed circle  will 
                                                 
15 In fact, we tracked investors’ negative net positions over various windows in post-issue trading and considered the 
first 40 trading day window as the most satisfactory one. 
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 account for a highly disproportionate share of total participation, and such is indeed the 
case.  While only 2% of SIs participate in 5 or more IPOs, these investors account for 30% 
of total participation (see Table V). 
D.  The Coalition Test 
We test the block-booking hypothesis by estimating the probability that a control group 
sample investor participates in a test group IPO.  We do so using probits.16  The test group 
consists of 35 IPOs, and the control group yields a list of 7491 sample investors.  
Consequently, our regression dataset contains 262,185 observations (35 * 7491).  One may 
find summary statistics on this dataset in Table VI, and the probits in Table VII. 
In specification CT1 of Table VII we estimate selection probability as a function of 
BookZeroR (and control variables) so as to test the IE hypothesis.  To recap: under the IE 
hypothesis, participating in a zero expected return IPO underwritten by bank b will indicate 
that the investor is not a member of b’s coalition, implying that b will not preferentially 
select such an investor for its test group IPOs.  Hence, the coefficient on BookZeroR (β1) 
will be insignificant or negative.  Under the block-booking hypothesis, however, 
participating in such an IPO indicates that the investor is a member of the bank’s coalition, 
implying that β1 will be positive and significant.   
Inspecting Table VII reveals that β1 is both positive and highly significant (after controlling 
for an investor’s general level of participation in the IPO market).  The empirical evidence 
on coalition membership is thus strongly inconsistent with the principal prediction of the IE 
hypothesis and (correspondingly) strongly in support of the block-booking hypothesis. 
We explore coalitions further in specification CT2 by adding BookOne, BookMany, and 
individual bank coalition strength variables.  CT2 yields several interesting results.  Consider 
each in turn. 
First, BookZeroR becomes insignificant.  Under the block-booking hypothesis, BookZeroR 
is simply a less informative measure of coalition membership than either BookOne or 
BookMany.  One would therefore expect this variable to become insignificant once one 
                                                 
16 We estimate the probits using the econometrics package Shazam. 
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 includes these variables in the regression.   
Second, BookOne and BookMany are highly significant (after controlling for an investor’s 
general level of participation in the IPO market), with BookMany having a considerably 
stronger effect than BookOne.  This pattern too is consistent with the block-booking 
hypothesis as one would expect BookMany to provide a more accurate indicator of 
coalition membership than BookOne. 
Third, our analysis indicates that the importance of coalition membership varies 
considerably across the banks in our sample (some of the BCS variables are large and 
significant), and that investor characteristics too affect an investor’s selection probability 
(GenPart is highly significant).  Though exploring these bank and investor effects is beyond 
the scope of this paper, we do plan to explore these effects in future work.   
To illustrate the economic significance of these results, we show in Table VIII how an 
investor’s selection probability varies with the investor’s general level of participation in the 
IPO market, IPO size, bank coalition strength, and the investor/bank relationship.  
Consider, for example, an investor who is active in the IPO market, a large IPO (one 
standard deviation above the mean), and a bank with a strong coalition.  If the investor is a 
member of the bank’s coalition (BookMany = 1), the bank selects that investor with 
probability 0.36.  If that investor is not a member of the bank’s coalition, the bank selects 
that investor with a probability of about 0.005.  If the bank has a weak coalition, on the 
other hand, a coalition investor’s selection probability falls to 0.06. 
Thus, coalition membership exercises an economically important influence upon an 
investor’s selection probability.  That is, investor coalitions exist. 
We note here that, if anything, our analysis may understate the importance of coalition 
membership.  Most importantly, we assign each IPO to a single bank (its book).  Since in 
reality the IPOs in our sample are underwritten by multi-bank syndicates, a considerable 
proportion of the investors who appear in a given bank’s control group IPOs will not be 
there because they are members of that bank’s coalition.  Consequently, one would not 
expect the bank to select such investors for its test group IPOs.  This effect will exert a 
downward bias on our estimate of the coalition membership variables.  Furthermore, our 
data, marvelous as it is, is not perfect (witness the fact that we pick some investors up 
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 through the negative net position channel).  Thus, we do not identify all of an IPO’s original 
investors.  This problem too will likely bias down our estimates of the coalition membership 
variables.  In addition, GenPart may measure (in part) membership in multiple coalitions.  
That is, the impact of GenPart on selection probability may arise because all banks tend to 
choose the same investors for their coalitions rather than because GenPart plays a role in 
selection probability as such.  This effect will also bias down our estimate of the coalition 
membership variables.  In light of these potential biases, we are confident that our coalition 
membership results arise because banks do form coalitions rather than as an artifact of the 
data. 
So, the empirical evidence indicates that banks do form stable coalitions of investors to 
whom they preferentially allocate shares in all of their IPOs.  Or, in other words, the data 
suggests that banks do indeed block-book.    
III. Conclusion         
A bank bringing a firm public must set the firm’s offer price before trading establishes its 
market value.  It follows that a bank inevitably presents an investor it invites to participate 
in an IPO with an opportunity to lemon-dodge, that is, to decline to participate in an IPO 
that the bank happens to overprice (to take advantage of this option, investors need only 
know whether the IPO’s offer price exceeds its market value, not the IPO’s market value 
itself).  A block-booking bank reduces the incentive to lemon-dodge by entering into a 
repeat game with a stable coalition of investors.  The bank underprices its IPOs on average 
(thereby making coalition membership valuable) and ejects any investor that does lemon-
dodge from its coalition.  The bank then sets an IPO’s offer price at the maximum level 
such that an investor finds remaining in the bank’s coalition more profitable than lemon-
dodging once.  In essence, block-booking enables a bank to amortize the cost of dealing 
with lemon-dodging in each of its IPO over a number of future IPOs, significantly reducing 
its per-IPO impact.         
In addition to explaining the obvious features of the IPO market (underpricing on average, 
volatility in initial returns, the variation in expected return by IPO type),  the block-booking 
theory yields two principal implications.  First, a block-booking bank sets offer prices to 
equalize downside risk across its offerings, not expected return.  James [2003] demonstrates 
that banks do set offer prices in this manner.  Second, a block-booking bank will form a 
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 stable coalition of investors to which it will preferentially allocate shares in all of its IPOs.  
Using a unique dataset that allows us to identify original investors in all large (>£10 million) 
IPOs in the UK over the 1997 to 2000 period, we find that banks do indeed form stable 
coalitions.  To illustrate, a bank with a strong coalition underwriting a large offering is about 
20 times more likely to allocate shares to a coalition investor (an investor with whom the 
bank has dealt before) than to a non-coalition investor, controlling for that investor’s 
general level of activity in the IPO market.  Thus, we conclude that banks do block-book. 
We note that block-booking inevitably leads to IPO shares being distributed “unfairly” in that a 
block-booking bank will favor the investors in its coalition over other investors.  Yet, while being 
a member of a bank’s coalition is definitely a good deal for the lucky investors so chosen, banks 
do not form coalitions to benefit those investors.  Rather, banks form coalitions because they 
must do so to block-book and a bank block-books because doing so enables it to bring projects 
to market more efficiently.  So, what appears to be “unfair” treatment of investors arises as a 
necessary byproduct of providing entrepreneurs with an efficient way to raise capital.  If one were 
to deny banks the ability to block-book, then, one would–at best–be raising the cost of capital for 
entrepreneurs in order to benefit (non-coalition) investors who have done nothing to deserve it.  
To paraphrase Talleyrand, imposing “fairness” in share allocation would be worse than unfair, it 
would be a blunder. 
Instead of acting to bring about “fairness” for investors, regulators may do better to 
concentrate on creating an efficient market for issuers.  And while the empirical evidence on 
underwriting strongly suggests that block-booking promotes such efficiency, this practice is 
at least potentially open to abuse.  Once a bank puts together a large enough coalition to 
ensure that its offering succeed, it can allocate a portion of shares to non-coalition investors.  
For such investors IPO shares are essentially free money due to the on-average 
underpricing that block-booking brings about.  A bank will thus be tempted to extract some 
revenue from these investors in exchange for offering them the shares.  Indeed, the US 
government’s investigation into IPO share allocation suggests that at least some banks 
yielded to this temptation.17   
To some extent, one might argue that this is a case of “no harm, no foul”.  That is, if the offer 
                                                 
17 “Morgan Stanley May Face Charges in IPO Investigation”, Wall Street Journal, 14 July 2003. 
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 price is set at the maximum level such that coalition investors do not find it worthwhile to 
lemon-dodge, the fact that a bank extracts side-payments from non-coalition investors does 
not affect the proceeds raised.  And from the perspective of maximizing social welfare, it can 
hardly matter whether or not a hedge fund must kick-back some portion of its free money to 
the underwriting bank.  However, if a bank can extract kick-backs from investors, then it will 
have an incentive to shade-down a firm’s offer price so as to increase the value of the kick-
backs it can extract.  Again, we emphasize here that the evidence on pricing does not suggest 
that banks underpriced tech stocks during the boom by an excessive amount relative to non-
tech stocks during non-boom years.  Nonetheless, the regulations governing the IPO process 
are clearly designed to align the incentives of the bank and the issuer by prohibiting the bank 
from (directly) profiting from underpricing.  Since individual issuers are in an extremely poor 
position to detect and respond to an incentive misalignment that may arise from banks’ lack of 
compliance with these regulations, regulators must monitor the market on their behalf so as to 
ensure that banks do not exploit the discretion that capital market efficiency demands they be 
granted.  
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3  
 
Proposition 3: A block-booking bank can almost costlessly induce coalition investors to reveal project flavor 
truthfully by exploiting collective action problems among them.  
Proof: At the road show the bank polls a large number Q of investors on project flavor.  
Denote the number of investors who declare the project to by of type L by DL.  The bank 
sets the project’s offer price at PL if DL ≥ Q/2, and at PH otherwise.  Each investor acts 
independently.   
Consider an investor Z and the interesting case in which the project is of type H.  Since the 
investors cannot collude and are identical, Z assumes that the probability that a non-Z 
investor declares L is φ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1.  Assume that φ is such that it maximizes Prob[DL,O = 
(Q/2) –1], where DL,O denotes the number of the Non-Z investors who declare L.  This 
assumption maximizes Z’s benefit from declaring L.  It follows that if Z does not find it 
optimal to declare L in these circumstances, there will not be an equilibrium in which any 
investor finds it optimal to declare L.   
If Z does declare L, then the bank ejects Z from the coalition.  Hence, if Z acts to mislead the 
bank by declaring L he also lemon-dodges (avoiding downside risk in the current offering) 
and loses future coalition profits of χ.  Denoting upside risk given that the project’s offer 
price equals PH (PL) by UH (UL), and downside risk by λH (λL), Z’s profit as function of what 
other investors do is:   
State Declare H eclare L Profitable Option 
DL,O ≥ Q/2 UL – λL UL – χ Declare H 
DL,O = (Q/2) – 1 UH – λH UL – χ Declare L 
DL,O < (Q/2) – 1 UH – λH UH – χ Declare H 
   
To see which option is the most profitable in each state, note that, since PL < PH, it follows 
that upside risk is larger and downside risk is smaller when the project’s offer price equals PL 
rather than PH (given that the project is of type H).  Recall also that we know from the block-
booking equilibrium condition that λH ≈ χ.  Hence,        
UL – λL > UL – χ 
UH – λH < UL – χ (A1) 
 and future coalition profits 
D
 
UH – λH ≈ UL – χ 
Note also that if the Bank shades down PH then the relative profit of declaring H increases (it 
is both more profitable to declare H in the current period
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 increase). 
E[πDeclare L] = (Prob[DL,O = (Q/2) L,O ≠ (Q/2) – 1] * F[PH] (A2) 
 term is 
itive.  It follows that if the bank can choose a large enough coalition, then Z will 
vor to be L when it is fact H even given the 
in text of the paper (assuming that the bank 
knew ject  s
then the bank can still ensure that declaring L is unprofitable by shading down PH (making the 
  
Z’s expected profit from declaring L equals 
– 1] * (∆)  – Prob[D
where ∆ denotes the profits Z obtains in the case that Z casts the deciding vote in favor of L.  
The first term in equation A2 is positive, but decreases to 0 as Q increases as the probability 
that the state is such that Z’s vote will be the deciding one decreases to 0.  The second
always pos
never find it worthwhile to declare project fla
equilibrium offer prices we derived in the ma
 pro flavor before etting offer price).  If the bank is constrained on coalition size, 
second term larger).  Since the bank can choose a reasonably large Q, it will never have to 
shade PH down by much to ensure that coalition investors declare project flavor truthfully.     
∴  
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 Figure 1 
Conditional Participation Probabilities 
In this figure we plot the probability that a sample investor who has participated in X sample IPOs participates 
in at least one more sample IPO.  Our IPO sample consists of the 130 new equity offerings on the London Stock 
Exchange (i.e., that appear on the Official List) or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) over the period 1 
January 1997 - 3 August 2000 that raised at least £10 million (excluding unit or investment trusts).  Our investor 
sample consists of the 10,303 FSA authorized firms that took a position in a sample IPO within its first 40 
trading days.  We count a sample investor as participating in a given IPO if either: 1) that investor bought shares 
in the IPO at the offer price on the offer date; or 2) that investor had a negative net position in the IPO’s stock at 
the close of its 40th trading day.    
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 Table I 
Coalition Test Variable Definitions 
We test the block-booking theory by seeing if a bank selects investors for its IPOs from a stable coalition.  To 
carry out the test, we allocate each IPO to (each of its) bookrunner(s) and split the IPOs into a control group and 
a test group.   We identify an investor i as a putative member of bank b’s coalition if that investor participated in 
at least one of b’s control group IPOs.  To establish that banks select investors from a stable coalition, we 
estimate the probability that a bank selects members of its putative coalition to participate in its control group 
IPOs.     
Variable Definition 
InvestYNi,t,b A dummy variable that equals 1 if investor i participates in test group 
IPO t (underwritten by bank b), and 0 otherwise 
BookZeroRi,t,b A dummy variable that equals 1 if investor i participated in a low 
(between –5% and +5%) expected return control group IPO brought 
public by the bank (b) underwriting the current IPO (t), and 0 otherwise 
BookOnei,t,b A dummy variable that equals 1 if investor i participated in only one 
control group IPO brought public by the bank (b) underwriting the 
current IPO (t), and 0 otherwise 
BookManyi,t,b A dummy variable that equals 1 if investor i participated in at least two 
control group IPOs brought public by the bank (b) underwriting the 
current IPO (t), and 0 otherwise 
GenParti The proportion of control group IPOs in which investor i took a position 
in the first 40 trading days 
Ln[Sizet] Ln[Total Proceeds (£ millions) of IPO t] 
BCSbi,t Bank b’s Coalition Strength variable equals 1 if b underwrote the current 
deal (t) and if either BookZeroR, BookOne, or BookMany equal 1, and it 
equals 0 otherwise.  Each major bank has its own Coalition Strength 
dummy, while second tier banks are assigned a common Coalition 
Strength dummy. 
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 Tables II 
Summary Statistics: IPOs 
Our IPO sample consists of the 130 new equity offerings on the London Stock Exchange (i.e., that appear on the 
Official List) or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) over the period 1 January 1997 - 3 August 2000 that 
raised at least £10 million (excluding unit offerings and investment trusts).   
 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Median 
Initial Return 0.2325 0.577 0.093 
Size (£ Millions) 110.95 151.19 77.74 
Ln[Size] 4.16 1.00 4.35 
Number of sample 
investors per IPO 
58.02 131.74 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 Table III 
The Number of IPOs by Book 
We assign each IPO to (each of) its bookrunner(s).  Sorting IPOs by offer date, we assign the first 2/3rds of each 
bank’s IPOs to the control group and the remaining 1/3rd to the test group.   In the event that banks A and B 
merge to form C, we assign all A and B IPOs to C.  We treat each second tier bank individually, but pool them 
together for reporting purposes.  Banks that underwrote fewer than three IPOs have all of their IPOs put into the 
control group (we use investor data from these banks to identify sample investors and to calculate each 
investor’s General Participation level).  The sample consists of 130 IPOs, 95 control group IPOs and 35 test 
group IPOs.  The sum of control group and test group IPOs in the table exceeds 130 due to multiple 
bookrunners.  
Bank Control Group IPOs Test Group IPOs 
Cazenove 12 5 
CSFB 4 2 
Deutche Morgan Grenfell 3 1 
Dresdner Kleinwort Benson 6 3 
Goldman Sachs 5 3 
Merrill Lynch 4 3 
Morgan Stanley 3 2 
UBS Warburg 10 5 
WestLB Panmure 5 3 
Second Tier 54 10 
Total Number of IPOs 106 37 
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 Table IV 
IPO Investors 
Our investor sample consists of the 10,303 FSA authorized firms that took a position in a sample IPO within its 
first 40 trading days.  We count a sample investor as participating in an IPO if either: 1) that investor bought 
shares in the IPO at the offer price on the offer date (the direct observation channel); or 2) that investor had a 
negative net position in the IPO’s stock at the close of its 40th trading day.  We identify investors using the 
FSA’s trade-reporting dataset Sabre which contains all secondary market and at least some primary market 
transactions executed in the UK.  Each FSA authorized firm is assigned a unique identifier number (a SIBREF) 
that enables us to track its transactions across banks.  We do not count an underwriting bank or a member of its 
syndicate as an investor in its own IPOs.     
Investors All IPOs Control Group 
IPOs 
Test Group 
IPOs 
In Control and 
Test Group 
Investor Sample 10303 7491 4038 1226 
Participating 
Investors:  
Direct Observation 
Channel 
3804 2047 2130 373 
Participating 
Investors:  
Negative Net 
Position Channel 
1565 1133 694 262 
Participating 
Investors: Total 
4322 2529 2287 494 
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 Table V 
The Distribution of IPO Participation 
In this table we report the distribution of IPO participation for sample investors.  The 10303 
sample investors participate a total of 7697 times in sample IPOs.    
Sample Investors Who 
Participate In… 
Proportion of Total 
Sample Investors 
Proportion of Total 
Investor Appearances 
O IPOs 58% 0% 
1 IPO 33% 35% 
2 – 4 IPOs 7% 35% 
5+ IPOs 2% 30% 
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 Table VI 
The Coalition Test: Sample Summary Statistics 
See Table I for variable definitions.  We track the participation in our 35 test group IPOs by the 7491 FSA 
authorized firms that took a position in a control group IPO in its first 40 trading days, leaving us with a dataset 
consisting of 262,185 observations.  For reasons of confidentiality, we cannot identify the bank to which each 
individual Bank Coalition Strength (BCS) Dummy applies.  We therefore sort BSC variables by the magnitude 
of their coefficient estimates in Table VII. 
Panel A: Discrete (0-1) Variables 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
InvestYN 0.0056 BCS 4 0.0022 
BookZeroR 0.0100 BCS 5 0.0039 
BookOne 0.0441 BCS 6 0.0004 
BookMany 0.0080 BCS 7 0.0029 
BCS1 0.0019 BCS 8 0.0023 
BCS 2 0.0117 BCS 9 0.0189 
BCS 3 0.0018 BCS–SecondTier 0.0067 
 
 
Panel B: Continuous Variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Median 
Size (£ Millions) 110.95 151.19 77.74 
Ln[Size] 4.16 1.00 4.35 
GenPart 0.022 0.051 0.011 
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 Table VII 
The Coalition Test: Estimating Selection Probabilities 
In this table we estimate the probability that a bank selects a control group sample investor to participate in one 
of its test group IPOs.  The dependent variable is InvestYNi,t,b, which equals 1 if control group sample investor i 
participates in test group IPO t (whose book is bank b), and 0 otherwise. Our dataset consists of 262,185 
observations.  We estimate each specification using a probit.  See Table 1 for variable definitions.  A “*” 
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  To avoid over-identification, we omit BCS9 from CT2.   
 CT1 CT2 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Stat Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Stat 
Constant -4.17* 0.05 78.42 -4.08* 0.06 68.93 
BookZeroR 0.66* 0.04 16.67 0.012 0.05 0.21 
BookOne – – – 0.29* 0.05 5.31 
BookMany – – – 1.06* 0.08 13.30 
GenPart 3.68* 0.08 47.80 3.64* 0.09 38.72 
BookMany* 
GenPart 
– – – -1.70* 0.19 -8.93 
Ln[Size] 0.30* 0.01 29.04 0.26* 0.01 22.17 
BCS1 – – – 1.20* 0.08 14.26 
BCS2 – – – 0.55* 0.06 8.85 
BCS3 – – – 0.51* 0.10 5.23 
BCS4 – – – 0.45* 0.09 5.11 
BCS5 – – – 0.33* 0.07 4.39 
BCS6 – – – 0.22 0.19 1.16 
BCS7 – – – -0.04 0.12 0.31 
BCS8 – – – -0.06 0.09 0.61 
BCS–
SecondTier 
– – – -0.10 0.12 0.82 
McFadden R2 0.23 0.28 
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Table VIII 
The Coalition Test: Selection Probabilities 
In this table we report our point estimate of the probability that a bank selects an investor for one of its IPOs as a 
function of the investor’s general level of activity in the IPO market, IPO size, bank coalition strength, and the 
relationship between the investor and the bank.  We calculate these probabilities using specification CT2 in 
Table VII.  We consider three levels of investor activity: Highly Active (GenPart = 0.2), Active (GenPart = 
0.05), and Inactive (GenPart = 0.01).  We consider two IPO sizes: Large (Ln[Size] = 5.16) and Average 
(Ln[Size] = 4.16).  We consider two bank types: Strong Coalition (BCS1) and Weak Coalition (BCS9).  We 
consider two levels of the Investor/Bank relationship: Non-Coalition (the investor did not participate in any of 
the bank’s control group IPOs) and Coalition (BookMany = 1).   
Case Investor/Bank Relationship 
Non-Coalition 
Investor 
Coalition Investor Investor and IPO 
Type 
Bank Type 
Selection Probabilities 
Strong Coalition 0.45 Highly Active Investor 
Large IPO 
Weak Coalition 
0.02 
0.09 
Strong Coalition 0.36 Highly Active Investor 
Average-Sized IPO 
Weak Coalition 
0.01 
0.06 
Strong Coalition 0.36 Active Investor 
Large  IPO 
Weak Coalition 
0.005 
0.06 
Strong Coalition 0.26 Active Investor 
Average-Sized IPO Weak Coalition 0.002 0.03 
Strong Coalition 0.33 Inactive Investor 
Large IPO Weak Coalition 0.001 0.05 
Strong Coalition 0.24 Inactive Investor 
Average-Sized IPO Weak Coalition 0.001 0.03 
 
